The shape of adjustment costs in factor demand has been a matter of controversy for quiet some time. While some researchers assume quadratic adjustment costs, i.e. that it becomes increasingly expensive to recruit workers in a given time period, others believe that there are economies of scale in recruitment. Surprisingly, there is hardly any evidence so far on the shape of hiring costs based on microeconomic data. In this paper we estimate the functional form of hiring costs in the theoretical framework of a generalized model of monopsony, using both parametric and nonparametric estimation techniques. We find strong evidence in favor of diseconomies of scale in recruiting skilled workers. Our results indicate that the labor market is monopsonistic.
Introduction
A firm that decides to hire new workers typically has to post a vacancy and then process an interview with the applicants it is interested in. Once the firm has decided to employ a new worker, training is necessary for the worker to adapt to the new job. In short, firms incur hiring costs, which include both the costs of recruiting and training a worker. These costs amount to a considerable sum. On average, the costs incurred by Swiss firms for hiring and training a skilled worker add up to CHF 13,500. Hiring costs are up to CHF 170,000, which equals almost two years of a worker's salary.
The structure of hiring costs determines how the firms change their demand for labor over time. If hiring costs featured a large fix cost component, firms would find it optimal to hire all their workers in one time period, which corresponds to the case of lumpy labor adjustment. Conversely, if it became increasingly expensive to hire many workers at once, firms would prefer to adjust labor smoothly over time. The structure of hiring costs therefore influences the effects of external shocks to labor markets. In case of a large positive productivity shock, firms would not adjust employment all at once, if there were diseconomies of scale in recruiting workers. Instead, adjustment would take place slowly over time. As well, the impact of labor market policies, e.g. subsidies for labor input, will depend on the costs that a firm has to incur if it decides to increase employment.
In contrast to the standard approach in the literature on factor demand, we characterize the structure of hiring costs in a setting of imperfect competition in labor markets. In recent years, the idea that labor markets have some monopsonistic aspects has become increasingly popular in the economic literature (for an extensive exposition see Manning, 2003) . The generalized model of monopsony (see Manning, 2006) analyzes the labor market from the real-world perspective that firms set wages. It is based on the assumption that the wage elasticity of the labor supply to a firm is finite. The firm can choose which wage to pay if it wants to keep employment at a certain level. If the firms decide to set a low wage, direct labor costs decrease. However, this will in turn increase the fluctuation rate, leading to higher hiring costs. Hence, in the generalized model of monopsony, the firms face a trade-off between direct and indirect labor costs. This is not the case in the perfectly competitive model where firms take wages as given. If firms offered a wage below the competitive wage level, they would not be able to recruit any workers at all. In the traditional monopsony model, there are no indirect labor costs either. The firms choose their optimal level of employment and have to pay a wage that is determined by the labor supply. Hence, firms can only recruit more workers by raising the wage.
The structure of hiring costs can only be characterized by conducting appropriate empirical studies. Just imposing a particular (convenient) form of hiring costs does not mean that the underlying assumption is correct, no matter how standard this assumption has become in the literature. Empirical studies must be based on microeconomic data which describe the workers' and the firms' characteristics that are relevant for the hiring costs. We use data from two representative firm-level surveys conducted in Swiss firms.
Our results support the hypothesis that there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment, i.e. that it becomes increasingly expensive for firms to hire a larger number of skilled workers within a given time period. Furthermore, we find evidence that labor markets are monopsonistic, indicating that firms have some market power over their workers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the general model of monopsony. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, we present our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Theory

Related Literature
This paper relates to the literature on factor demand models, summarized by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) . In the literature, different forms have been proposed for the cost of adjustment associated with altering the demand for labor. The literature on labor demand predominantly relies on convex adjustment costs. In particular, the adjustment costs are assumed to be quadratic. Alternative specifications are linear adjustment costs and lumpy (i.e. fixed) adjustment costs. For a particular set of individual plants, Hamermesh (1989) finds that the standard model of convex variable adjustment costs is inferior to a specification based on fixed costs of adjustment. However, data do not allow to discriminate between different models of adjustment costs in general. Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997) use a different approach to analyze labor adjustment. Manufacturing establishments are assumed to adjust employment probabilistically, with adjustment probabilities being a function of the deviation between desired and actual level of employment. The empirical analysis of Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) suggests the presence of nonconvexities in the adjustment costs.
Using British data, Manning (2006) presents evidence which implies that there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment. In contrast to our data, there is no information on wages in the British data set. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) attempt to directly estimate hiring costs using a detailed matched employer-employee data set for France and find a large fix-cost component in hiring workers for management positions, but none for other skill groups. Unfortunately, also their study has a drawback because they cannot observe training costs of newly hired workers, which will prove to be an important source of hiring costs in our data. Kramarz and Michaud (2004) estimate the shape of hiring costs, using longitudinal matched employer-employee data from France. But again, data on training the newly hired employees is not available in their survey.
Summing up the empirical literature on hiring costs, we conclude that despite the large theoretical literature there is no empirical study to our knowledge which could directly estimate hiring costs without having to omit important variables in the process.
The Model
The model of the labor market used in this paper is based on the generalized model of monopsony introduced by Manning (2006) . In contrast to other models used in the literature on employment adjustment costs, the wage is no more treated as exogenously given to the firm. H(R, N, w) denotes the costs of recruiting and training a worker. These costs depend firstly on the number of recruits R. We do not specify a functional form with regard to R. Instead, we allow the marginal hiring costs with respect to R to be increasing, constant or decreasing. As well, H depends on the number of skilled workers N that are already employed by the firm, since a large N could influence the recruitment process. Also, firms with a large N might be more attractive because they provide better career opportunities, which would in turn make it easier for such firms to hire workers. The wage w has two effects on H. Firstly, firms offering high wages are more attractive, hence more individuals will apply to vacancies. But a higher w also makes training more costly, since in the initial period after a worker is employed, he does not reach his full level of productivity. During this period a firm has to pay w, which will be higher than the worker's productivity.
In our simple model the only production factor is labor. Hence, the firm maximizes the present discounted value of its profits max Rt,wt,N t+1
subject to the constraint
where s(w) is the separation rate, i.e. the percentage of skilled workers that leaves the firm per period, with 0 ≤ s(w) ≤ 1. 1 β = 1 1+r is the discount 1 The separation rate is assumed to be continuous in the wage. We can in fact test this assumption and find an elasticity of -0.4, i.e. a 10% increase in the wage leads to a 4% decrease in the separation rate. This indicates that the firm can reduce the separation rate by paying a higher wage.
factor.
We solve the problem of the firm applying dynamic programming. Hence, we define the value function V (N ) to be the discounted value of profits if the employer has employment equal to N . The maximization problem in the Bellman form can then be written as:
Substituting (2) into (1) yields
Taking the first-order condition of this maximization problem with respect to R t yields
The first-order condition with respect to w t can be written as
To get a further optimality condition it is usual to apply the envelope theorem in the Bellman context. In our case this is the derivative of the value function with respect to N t :
In the steady state, wages and employment are constant. This implies that we can rewrite (6) and solve for V ′ (N ):
Now we rewrite the first-order conditions for the steady state. Considering condition (4) yields
Substituting (7) into (8) yields
Now we do the same procedure for the second first-order condition. We rewrite (5) in terms of steady state and use equation (9):
Following Manning (2006), we introduce a labor cost function, which is the per-worker share of hiring costs C = HR N . In the steady state R = sN , hence
With the two equations above, we can rewrite the optimality condition (9), which yields
and the optimality condition (10), which yields
Expression (11) denotes the optimality condition for profit maximizing firms. In the optimum, the marginal product of labor must be equal to the marginal cost of labor. Under perfect competition in the labor market, the marginal cost of labor is equal to the wage. In the generalized model of monopsony with hiring costs, marginal costs of labor exceed the wage if the per-worker hiring costs are positive and increase in the level of employment.
Data
Survey design and data
The data used here is from two representative firm-level surveys conducted The firms were asked about the number of skilled workers with a vocational degree that they have hired in the previous three years. The questionnaires were filled out either by management or the human resources department. The answers reflect average costs of hiring a skilled worker with a vocational degree over the external labor market. The survey has been stratified by firm size and the two-digit-industry level. 3 The firms were asked 2 Public firms and non-profit organizations have been excluded from the sample, since the principle of profit-maximization does not fully apply to those firms.
3 The industry level is defined according to NOGA, as proposed by the Swiss Federal Statistics Office. All tables that are presented in this paper have been weighted with the corresponding survey weights that were provided by the Swiss Federal Statistics Office. For details on the construction of the weights see Potterat (2006) .
to fill out hiring costs for a specific profession, which makes it easier to compare hiring costs across firms, since the comparisons can be made within a homogenous profession rather than across different occupations only. 4
Calculation of hiring costs
The calculation of hiring costs consists of two parts, the costs of recruiting a worker, subsequently denoted by r, and the costs of initial training that is necessary to adapt to the new job, subsequently denoted by a. Firstly, the recruiting costs r i consist of costs for posting a vacancy v i , the costs of the time that is needed to process an interview per applicant c ai , as well as the costs for external advisors or placement agencies e i . More formally, the recruitment costs can be written as
where J i is the number of applicants per vacancy that are invited for an interview, and c ai is the costs to conduct one interview, which is the product of the time spent (in hours per worker) to interview an applicant times the corresponding wage of the workers involved in the interview process. 5 Secondly, there are costs to the firm that arise because a newly appointed skilled worker will not immediately be fully productive. In the questionnaire, firms were asked for how many days d ai a new worker is less productive than an average skilled worker in the firm. The relative productivity is denoted by p i . There are several reasons why a newly hired worker is less productive initially. One possible explanation is firm specific human capital, which first has to be accrued before a worker can be fully productive, such as getting to know the firm environment, production processes and colleagues. Other reasons for lower productivity might be that newly hired workers receive training away from the workplace. This is costly to the firm in two ways: firstly, the firm has to pay the worker the daily salary w di during the number of training days d ti , and secondly, there are direct training costs c ti for internal or external training personnel, travel costs or course fees. As a result, the adaptation costs a i can be written as
As a result, the hiring costs 6 in a firm i to fill a vacancy are given by
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics (Table 2) show that on average, hiring costs H to fill vacancy are CHF 13,500. There is considerable variation, since the maximum hiring costs are above CHF 170,000, which equals about two years of a worker's salary, while some firms have hiring costs of practically zero. 7 This variation is of interest for obvious reasons and will be explored later on. The adaption costs a are, on average, accountable for about two thirds of total hiring costs, mainly due to costs associated with lower productivity during the adaption period. The remaining third of hiring costs is due to recruitment costs. Almost 80% of the recruitment costs are caused by processing interviews of job-applicants. While a single interview costs on average only somewhat less than CHF 400, total interview costs are considerably higher, because on average, a firm interviews about 5 applicants to fill a single vacancy. The costs for external advisors or placement agencies are quite low on average, and amount to about 10% of the recruitment costs, but can still be large for a single firm that uses such services, since the maximum amount paid for external placement agencies amounts to CHF 30,000.
6 Sometimes there is criticism against constructing a LHS-variable. But the only alternative would be to directly ask the firms about the monetary costs of hiring skilled workers. The problem with this approach would be that firms might use different accounting procedures to internally calculate their costs. In our case, the hiring costs are calculated in exactly the same way for all firms, wich makes comparison much more reliable.
7 The model of Mortensen (2003) predicts marginal hiring costs of two years salary for a firm paying the median wage in Denmark.
While overall averages give a first indication about hiring costs, we need to explore the data in greater detail. In a first step, the descriptive statistics are presented by firm size categories (Table 3 ). The total hiring costs H are increasing rather strongly by firm size. Very small firms with less than 10 employees spend on average 12,000 CHF to fill a vacancy, while large firms with 100 or more employees have to bear hiring costs that are almost twice as high. It is interesting to note that the composition of the hiring costs differs quite substantially by firm size.
The recruitment costs r increase strongly in firm size. Firms with 100 and more employees have recruitment costs that are on average almost four times higher than those of the smallest firms. This is due to higher costs for posting vacancies and higher per-applicant interview costs.
There are two reasons why the interview costs are higher for larger firms. Firstly, they spend more time interviewing an applicant than smaller firms (see Table 4 ). On average, the smallest firms spend about 6.5 hours hours per applicant. 8 Large firms with 100 or more employees spend twice as much time to interview a single job-applicant. The time spent to conduct interviews is increasing in firm size, both for management and skilled workers. On average, more than 50 percent of the time needed to conduct an interview is due to time spent by skilled workers and about 40 percent by management and the remainder by workers with no vocational degree. The second reason why interview costs are higher for large firms is because the salary of the workers conducting the interview is higher (see Table 5 ). The biggest difference in median salary across the different firm size categories is observed for management positions. Small firms pay a median hourly wage of CHF 56.3, while firms in the largest firm size group pay a corresponding wage of CHF 73.3, which amounts to a wage differential of 30%. Skilled workers with a vocational degree in the largest firm size category earn 20% more than their colleagues in the smallest firms. The differences in wages for workers with no vocational degree are not as pronounced. As a conclusion, the main reason why large firms have higher interview costs per applicant is that they spend more time interviewing applicants, and -but to a much smaller extent -because the workers who conduct the interviews earn higher wages, which makes interview time itself more costly.
While larger firms spend more time interviewing job-applicants, they do not invite significantly more applicants to a job interview for a single vacancy. On average, firms interview about five candidates; only the largest firms invite slightly more job-candidates. This indicates that larger firms select their applicants more carefully, since they spend more time on a given number of applicants. Furthermore, large firms make use of external advisors or headhunters to fill a vacancy more frequently than small firms.
While the recruitment costs differ substantially by firm size, adaption costs (a) increase only slightly for larger firms (see Table 3 ). The adaption period d a , during which newly hired workers are less productive compared to an average skilled worker in the corresponding firm, usually lasts about 80 days and does not differ significantly in firm size. As well, the average productivity-decrease compared to an average skilled worker within a firm is on average about 30%, and increases only slightly in firm size. The main reason why adaption costs are somewhat higher for large firms is due to the higher wage costs of skilled workers. The daily wage costs for a skilled worker with a vocational degree in a small firm are CHF 339, while they are CHF 400 for a firm with 100 or more employees. As well, newly hired workers in large firms spend more time in training courses. The direct costs for training are quite low and amount to about CHF 1200 in the largest firm size category.
From now on, the focus will be on the aggregate hiring costs H. Figure  2 shows a histogram of the hiring costs. The distribution of H is skewed to the right with about 50% of the observations lying between 5,000 and 17,000 CHF.
Econometric models and empirical analysis
In this section, we want to empirically estimate the functional form of the hiring costs H and the labor costs C with respect to the number of recruits R. Our main interest is to test the hypothesis whether there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment. In addition, we derive implications for the functioning of the labor market.
Econometric modeling
In the following subsection, we will estimate the functional form of the hiring costs, using local polynomial regression estimators. The regression model is of the form
where y i denotes hiring costs and x i denotes the number of recruits. We are interested in the functional form m(x), which is linear in the neighborhood of x 0 , such that m(x) = a 0 + b 0 (x − x 0 ) in the neighborhood of x 0 . 9 The local linear regression estimator minimizes
w.r.t. to the parameters a 0 and b 0 , where K denotes the Kernel weighting function. As a result,m(x) =â 0 +b 0 (x − x 0 ) in the neighborhood of x 0 . There are different estimators that can be applied. We will apply a Lowess estimator (see Cleveland, 1979) which uses a variable bandwith and a tricubic kernel K(z) = (70/81)(1−|z| 3 ) 3 1(|z| < 1), that has the advantage of being more robust against outliers than other estimators. 10 9 see Cameron and Trivedi (2006) , p. 320. 10 We have also applied other local polynomial regression estimators, using an Epanechnikov Kernel with first as well as a third degree polynomial. The results were qualitatively the same as for the Lowess estimator but differed somewhat at the boundaries. The estimations were carried out in Stata using the -lowess-and -locpoly-commands.
Secondly, we also estimate parametric multivariate regression models of the form below, since the use of nonparametric estimation techniques is restricted when the number of regressors becomes large:
where x 1 denotes the number of recruits, the firm size and the wage. In addition, x 2 includes control variables for macroeconomic conditions, industry structure and different professions.
Estimating the hiring cost function
The functional form of the hiring costs H is crucial to determine whether there are economies or diseconomies of scale in recruitment. If there are economies of scale, it is optimal for a firm to hire all skilled workers at the same time. Conversely, if there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment, it is best for a firm to adjust its labor force continuously.
Empirically, we find that the hiring costs H to fill a vacancy are an increasing function of the number of recruits R, but the effect diminishes as the number of recruits R becomes large (see Figure 1) . Increasing average costs in turn imply that the marginal costs are increasing in R. This implies that it becomes increasingly expensive for a firm to hire additional workers in a given time period. As well, this means that the total costs are a convex function of the number of recruits.
While a bivariate relationship gives first insights, a multivariate analysis provides additional information. In order to estimate the effect of the number of recruits R on the hiring costs H, we assume the following iso-elastic functional form of the hiring cost function (as in Manning, 2006) :
Taking logs, we estimate the following function empirically:
We want to test the hypothesis whether an increase in R increases H. To control for the possibility that recruitment depends on the number of skilled workers employed in a firm, we included the level of skilled workers N in the profession in which the firm incurs the hiring costs. As well, we control for the total firm size by including the number of workers in other occupations.
The OLS-regressions (see Table 1 ) show that the number of recruits R affect the hiring costs significantly. Because of the log-log specification, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. A 10% increase in the number of recruits increases the hiring costs per vacancy by about 2%, depending on the model specification. Since the average hiring costs increase in the number of recruits, the marginal hiring costs are increasing in the number of recruits as well. This is evidence for the existence of diseconomies of scale in recruitment. If large fixed costs were present, we would expect that the average hiring costs decrease in the number of recruits.
The level of skilled workers N has no significant effect on H. But the level of employment other than N has a positive and significant effect on H. A 10% increase in the level of employment of other than skilled workers N increases H by about 0.1%. An explanation for this result is that large firms might have different requirements to their workers than small firms. This is also reflected in the descriptive statistics in the sense that large firms spend much more time to interview a job-applicant. This might also be due to the firm's organizational structure, i.e. the recruitment process itself is more complex. For example, in large firms a job-applicant will be interviewed by a person from the human resource department, then from the head of division and finally by the team leader at the workplace itself. The wage of skilled workers has a strong and positive impact on the hiring costs. As described in section 2.2, the wage w has two effects on H. Firstly, the firms that offer high wages are more attractive to workers, which lowers recruitment costs. But a higher wages makes the initial period after a worker is employed more costly, since a worker does not reach full productivity immediately but receives full pay. Our results suggest that the second effect dominates the first effect.
The effects described above are robust to different specifications. In the models (2) and (3), more control variables have been included, such as the per-capita regional (cantonal) aggregate income to control for different economic performances in different regions of the country (Model 2). As expected, H is higher in regions with high per-capita aggregate income, as skilled labor usually becomes scarce if economic activity is high (ceteris paribus). In model (3) we controlled for different industries, as well as for the most common professions for skilled workers with a vocational degree (for a description see Table 6 in the Appendix).
Estimating the labor cost function
Assuming that employment N is constant in the steady state, the costs per worker to keep employment at this level are given by the labor cost function C = sH. It can be seen that the level of H is not the only determinant of C. Given the employment level N , the fluctuation rate s determines the number of recruits R that have to be hired in a given period, since R = sN .
Analogous to H, we assume that
Since sN = R and C = sH in the steady state, we get
Taking logs yields ln H ≡ c + δ ln w + (γ 0 − 1) ln R + (γ 1 + 1) ln N Using the results from our preferred model (3) above, we can infer the coefficients for γ 0 and γ 1 , since γ 0 = β 0 + 1 = 1.19
The elasticity of C with respect to N is γ 0 + γ 1 = 0.16. 11 We can test whether γ ≡ γ 0 + γ 1 = 0. A Wald-Test of the hypothesis that γ = 0 is rejected with a p-value < 0.0001. Hence, this implies that an increase in the level of skilled workers N by 10% increases the per-worker hiring costs C by 1.6%. While this effect is relatively small, it implies that the per-worker hiring costs are increasing in N .
Implications for the effective labor supply curve
In the generalized model of monopsony, the firm can choose which wage to pay if it wants to keep employment at a certain level N . But if the firm decides to set a low wage w, the fluctuation rate s(w) will increase, leading to higher per-worker hiring costs C. Hence, the firm faces a trade-off between direct labor costs w and indirect labor costs C and solves
This expression is the effective labor supply curve, as introduced in Manning (2006) . Applying the envelope theorem 12 yields
As a result, the effective labor supply curve is upward sloping if the labor costs C are increasing in N . This is what we showed in the previous section. Hence, we can provide evidence in favor of the generalized model of monopsony. In contrast to the traditional simple model of monopsony, firms can increase their employment both by paying higher wages and by raising expenditures on recruitment activities. Since we find a positive influence of the level of employment on the labor costs C, we conclude that the generalized model of monopsony provides a better theoretical framework to analyze labor markets. In a perfectly competitive labor market, the total per-worker labor costs would simply be given by the wage, which cannot be influenced by a single 11 In equilibrium, R = sN , hence C = w δ s γ 0 N γ 0 +γ 1 . 12 Assuming that C(w, N ) is differentiable and Cww > 0, the first-oder condition is Cw(w, N ) = −1, which is the same as equation (12) in the dynamic model. firm and is independent of the level of employment. As well, if a firm pays a wage that is slightly below the competitive wage, it would be unable to recruit any workers at all. This is not what we find in the data since there is a continuous relationship between the wage and the separation rate. We find an elasticity of the separation rate with respect to the wage of −0.4, which is substantial but not infinite as it would be predicted by the competitive model.
Conclusions
So far, only few studies were able to directly estimate the shape of the hiring costs. Instead, dynamic labor demand models were used to indirectly estimate the functional form of hiring costs. Based on directly observable empirical data, our results suggest that the marginal costs of hiring skilled workers are increasing in the number of recruits. It implies that recruiting skilled labor becomes increasingly expensive in a given time period. Our findings are crucial for the hiring strategy of a firm. The results suggest that the optimal hiring policy for a firm is to recruit skilled workers continuously rather than grouping the recruits, which would be optimal if large fix costs were present. Our results are in line with Manning (2006) , but not with the findings of Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) , who conclude that firms prefer large adjustments over small ones. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) find that hiring costs feature large fix costs, but only for management positions.
In a framework of a generalized monopsony, as proposed by Manning (2006) , our results provide evidence that firms have considerable market power over their workers. This is an important finding if one is interested in analyzing labor markets, since policy interventions as well as external shocks to the labor market have different effects compared to a perfectly competitive labor market. 
